



Gogacz – Judycki. 
Two concepts of the individuality of a human person
In the research paper Samoświa-
domość i unikalność osób ludzkich 
Stanisław Judycki points out the 
disparity in the discussion of the 
individuality of human persons. 
Over the history of philosophy the 
individuality of persons against the 
backdrop of the natural world has 
frequently been an object of study, 
but attempts at answering the question of what is a person’s individuality 
in the world of other human persons have been few and far between. The 
call “Gnothi seauton” (know thyself) inscribed in stone at the ancient 
temple in Delphi seems to imply that the question of individuality has 
been present in philosophical reflection since antiquity. But that is not 
the case. The true intention behind the above-mentioned inscription was 
not to urge man to know himself as a unique individuum, but to make 
him realise mortality and imperfection, in contrast to God’s immortality 
and perfection. Nor does the Boethian definition of person convey the 
sense of individuality we wish to address here. In the statement “Persona 
est rationalis naturae individua substantia” (a person is an individual 
substance of rational nature) the term individua is used to signify parti-
cularity as opposed to generality, that is a universal, and not uniqueness. 
The question of a person’s individuality understood as his uniqueness 
appeared in the medieval scholastic philosophy, but it was not a separate 
philosophical problem. More often than not, it was addressed as part of 
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theological deliberation. Nowadays, it is theology and psychology rather 
than philosophy that discuss the uniqueness of a person.1
The proposition whereby each human person is an individual being 
essentially different than any other human persons will be illustrated 
with the concepts of individuality developed in the contemporary Polish 
philosophy by Mieczysław Gogacz and Stanisław Judycki. The following 
discussion will serve as a look at the problem of individuality taken from 
two different philosophical perspectives: Thomistic metaphysics and 
phenomenological epistemology. The answer to the question about the 
individuality of a human person is of particular relevance for Thomism 
and phenomenology, in which the issues concerned with man as a person 
constitute one of the central points in philosophical inquiry. The purpose 
of the present discussion is to demonstrate that the metaphysical analysis 
of a human person and the epistemological description of his direct 
experience are peculiarly complementary approaches. The Thomistic 
reflection seeks to answer the question about who man is as an individual 
being, while phenomenological reflection seeks to answer the question 
of how man experiences himself as an individuum. These approaches 
contribute irreducible and yet crucial contents to the philosophical 
knowledge of man.
1. Defining individuality
Mieczysław Gogacz attempts to find the basis of the individuality 
of a human person in his ontic structure. He addresses the problem of 
individuality while discussing the relationship between man’s soul and 
body.2 The method he employs as he develops his propositions is one of 
 1 Cf. S. Judycki, Samoświadomość i unikalność osób ludzkich, http://www.kul.pl/materialy-do-
-pobrania,art_19301.html, PDF: p. 7 (02.04.2014) and cf. A. Kijewska, Filozof i jego muzy. Antropologia 
Boecjusza – jej źródła i recepcja, Kęty 2011, p. 108.
 2 “The European intellectual culture first witnessed the rise of the issues concerned with man. 
[...] The issues concerned with the person were developed along with Christianity. This is because 
the understanding of man was complicated by the figure of Christ, who according to the Christian 
Revelation is both God and man. In order to shed more light on this intractable ontic structure [...], 
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identification of the principles of being. He proves his propositions by 
referring to the method of consistentisation, that is demonstrating that 
accepting an opposite thesis will result in absurdity.
Stanisław Judycki looks for the foundation of individuality in analysis 
of direct experience. He inquires about the reason for the presence in 
human consciousness of “I,” that is the subject of conscious processes. 
As he proves his propositions, he refers to the consistency of theses 
developed on a discursive basis or employs content coherence arguments. 
He makes use of descriptions and analogies which perform an illustrative 
function in his discussion.3
1.1. Thomistic definition of individuality
To define individuality, Gogacz uses the terms “individual,” “unique” 
and “singular.” He uses them in reference to every real being – every 
existing concretum. He distinguishes real beings from thought “beings,” 
that is constructs of the intellect, artefacts of technology and art. In the 
field of metaphysics he focuses his attention on real beings only. He 
excludes thought “beings” and artefacts from the sphere of metaphysical 
deliberation. Every real being, he claims, is formed out of the act 
of existence, which is a reason for its reality, and out of the essence 
constituting the reason for its identity. The Absolute, an ontically simple 
being formed out of the act of existence, is an exception. As the Self-
contained Act of Existence, that is an uncaused being, it is an efficient 
cause of all accidental beings. The Self-contained Act of Existence does 
not create beings, but acts of existence. This does not mean that the 
existence of a created being is apart from its essence. In the order of 
time creating existence takes place simultaneously with the rise of being 
as a whole. Simultaneous with the action of the efficient cause, which 
creates the existence of derivative being, is the action of the final causes, 
the issues concerned with the person were addressed” (M. Gogacz, Wokół problemu osoby, Warszawa 
1974, pp. 14–15).
 3 Cf. S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby. Próba z zakresu teologii filozoficznej, Poznań 2010, pp. 11–12.
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which are the reasons for its essence. As regards man, parents are the 
causes of body, and spiritual substances (separate substances) are causes 
of his soul. A created act of existence acts in the emergent being, making 
it real and actual. Making real consists in originating, realising of being, 
and making actual consists in connecting all the principles with the act 
of existence, thereby causing ontic unity.4
In the order of being, existence is an act, and essence is potency. 
In relation to the act of existence, essence is a sum of specific 
particularisations peculiar to a given act of existence. As it actualises the 
essence of being, the act of existence actualises in it a species-specific 
form, that is a soul. A form, which is an act in the order of essence, imparts 
essential definiteness to the sphere of potency. If the act of existence did 
not actualise in the essence of being its form, beings would be devoid of 
species identity and thus would be identical. They would lack principium 
underlying being a plant, an animal or a human. The essential sphere of 
potency, actualised by form, includes material potency and immaterial 
potency. Material potency along with material accidents constitutes 
a human body. In the Thomistic tradition it is customarily assumed that 
the singularity of man, and his distinctness from all other individua in 
the same species is determined by matter. And on account of this - asks 
Gogacz - at the moment of death, which marks separation of matter 
and form, does the human soul lose its individuality? Is the destruction 
of man’s ontic structure tantamount to the destruction of his personal 
duration? That is the main metaphysical problem to be confronted on the 
threshold of the theory of the individuality of a human person.5
1.2. Phenomenological definition of individuality
Every living entity is individual. The individuality of non-
personal entities is different from the individuality of persons. The 
 4 Cf. M. Gogacz, Elementarz metafizyki, Warszawa 1998, p. 32.
 5 Cf. ibidem, p. 31 and I. Ziemiński, Życie wieczne. Przyczynek do eschatologii filozoficznej, 
Kraków–Poznań 2013.
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latter is something far more perfect, a radical otherness of “worlds,” 
a “metaphysical uniqueness.” Non-personal entities can only be referred 
to as “individual,” while personal entities as “unique.”6 Inanimate 
objects and non-personal entities are individuated by space, time and 
bestowed properties. As regards persons, space and time are “weak” 
individuators. They can be considered to be signs of individuality 
(indicia individuationis), but not principles of individuality (principia 
individuationis). Space and time individuate persons only formally. The 
same goes for bestowed properties - these individuate inanimate objects 
to a greater degree than persons. This is because even highly complicated 
“constellations of properties,” that is arrangements of both physical 
and non-physical characteristics are replicable, but also because the 
uniqueness of persons is not a superstructure over their properties. An 
example of such a superstructure may be a melody which appears over 
the substructure of a sequence of sounds, thus creating a new quality. 
If persons were individuated by arrangements of properties, the same 
persons might be created many times.7
The only factor appropriately individuating persons can be a quality 
not built on top of any ensemble of properties, that is an absolutely 
simple quality. Human persons – claims Judycki – are different in that 
each one of them is a “unique quality.” A unique quality of a person is 
not a “constellation of properties,” but unique content. Consequently, 
getting to know a person differs fundamentally from getting to know his 
character traits. The knowledge of character traits is not knowledge of 
a person himself, or his “individual nature.”8 Getting to know a person 
 6 “[…] I would like to reserve the term «uniqueness» for personal beings, that is free, ra-
tional and self-conscious beings, while leaving the term «individuality» to be used in reference to 
all other beings. I will be trying to demonstrate that only persons are unique beings” (S. Judycki, 
Samoświadomość i unikalność…, p. 8).
 7 Cf. ibidem, pp. 9-10.
 8 “[...] the subject that I am does not identify with any of its character traits, nor with any one 
of the objects that it is aware of, and on account of this one might want to follow Edmund Husserl, 
one of the famous philosophers of the 20th century, in saying that this subject is a «pure I and noth-
ing more». However, if it were the case, if my consciousness and my self-discovery were based on 
the pure subject, that is the subject with no properties, then the questions of who we are and who 
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would be possible only if it were possible to identify his singularity. Does 
the general and notional character of human cognition allow that? How 
can we establish that that which we have recognised as uniqueness is in 
fact uniqueness? How can we identify uniqueness and differentiate it 
from that which is not unique? Such are the greatest difficulties emerging 
at the starting point for epistemological deliberations.9
As can be seen, Thomism and phenomenology differently define the 
individuality of a person and are confronted by different difficulties. When 
treated separately, the Thomistic and phenomenological approaches 
constitute fragmentary knowledge of the individuality of a person. 
These two fragments are two different perspectives from which to view 
the individuality of a human person. Thomism places philosophical 
reflection in the outer, objective perspective, whereas phenomenology – 
in the inner, subjective one.
2. The subject of individuality
2.1. Man as an individuum
Highlighting the individuality of man within Thomistic metaphysics 
is about pointing to the essential dissimilarity between his ontic 
structure and the ontic structure of other beings accessible to sensuous 
and intellectual cognition, that is plants and animals. The structure of 
man can be discovered by way of analysing his actions. The first kind of 
actions is getting to know the world and reacting to the world in a sensory 
manner. Man can see and hear, can sense olfactory, gustatory and tactile 
stimuli, as well as nourish feelings and desires. These actions indicate 
presence of sensory powers of cognition and aspiration in his essence. 
We can observe effects of their activity in the body. Therefore, we can 
we consider ourselves to be would be even more pressing. In a case like this someone might want to 
return to the starting point and say: «After all we are humans, corporeal beings endowed with rea-
son, capable of culture creation and of action». That, however, would not appear to be a good an-
swer, because it would not be clear who as an individuum this rational, corporeal being capable of 
producing cultural goods, etc. is” (ibidem, p. 7).
 9 Cf. ibidem, p. 6.
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assume that an element of the essence of man is material potency along 
with material accidents subjectified in this essence, but not intrinsic to it 
due to being ontically unnecessary.
Another kind of human actions consists in developing concepts, 
passing judgements, engaging in reasoning and making decisions. 
Because these actions and their effects are immaterial, we agree that 
their subject is immaterial as well. It is immaterial potency thanks to 
which man has a power of cognition, that is intellect, and a power of 
aspiration, that is will. Material and immaterial potency requires that 
the existence of an act-like factor triggering the two types of potency be 
accepted as existing within the essence of man. It is a substantial form, 
that is a human soul.10
Man is a spiritual and corporeal unity.11 Neither his soul, nor his body 
is a substance. A body is a substance in no sense whatsoever. Nor is it 
actuality, that is an act, nor can it exist independently. It is potentiality, an 
ensemble of unactualisations, a sum of particularisations inside a form, 
a factor imparting ontic imperfection to a soul.12 A soul is a complete 
substance with regard to existence, but an incomplete substance with 
regard to a species. It does not exist before emergence of being as an 
entirety. As a form of a body, it cannot exist without matter that brings 
particularity into it.  When it comes into being, it can last even when 
separated from the body. As it rids the soul of material potency, death 
 10 Cf. M. Gogacz, Istnieć i poznawać, Warszawa 1978, pp. 160–161.
 11 “When the body pervades the soul, it is a particular being from the start. And on account 
of this one might even make quite a paradoxical statement that there is no soul as a soul, but from 
the very moment the act of existence realises this form which is made imperfect by potency, there 
is man, just man. It is only actions specific to man that indicate his spiritual and material structure, 
a peculiar compound thanks to which man is not an absolute act in the order of essence, nor a pure 
being in the order of real being. Such an approach is pluralistic” (ibidem, p. 168).
 12 “If we call this visible structure with a specific shape, colour, dimensions a human body, then 
it means that we have introduced into the area of philosophy a positivist notion of matter, equat-
ed with being of a complex and complete – specific to a given being – structure without which it is 
impossible to exist as something specific, as this particular being. According to the classical philos-
ophy the human body cannot be a substantial being, nor can it be an act. It must be potency. [...] 
Only something that is still being actualized, that is not yet accomplished, that is still becoming in 
man can be a body” (ibidem, p. 161).
66 Bożena Listkowska
“cripples” it, preventing it from continuing in ontic unity with the body, 
but it does not destroy it. The human soul is a spiritual act, which as such is 
not subject to destruction, unlike immaterial forms of plants and animals 
which cease to exist once their corporeal structures are destroyed.13
The substantial forms of animals and plants are not spiritual, but only 
immaterial and because of this are less firmly coupled with the act of 
existence than the rational form. Gogacz attributes a special ontic role to 
rationality. He claims that the rational soul requires “[...] such a structure 
distinct from other forms, where immateriality is complemented by the 
soul’s stronger link with existence than with potency. Apart from the 
human soul, the forms of beings in a sense lean in the direction of their 
specific potency, rather than in the direction of existence. And when 
separated from the act of existence, they share the fate of matter, that is 
they perish, because matter, as peculiar non-being perishes when it is 
not embedded in some subject. A soul leaning more towards existence – 
in the event that man ceases to exist – does not become separated from 
existence but from potency, that is the body.”14
The human soul lasts after man’s death, because its goal is not 
accomplished in forming the body – actualising matter. It is capable of 
rational cognition thanks to spiritual powers of cognition, which are the 
passive intellect (intellectus possibilis) and the active intellect (intellectus 
agens). It is also capable of accepting the results of its cognition thanks 
to the spiritual power of choice, that is will (voluntas). As it possesses 
spiritual powers of cognition and decision, it has a “richer ontic structure” 
than the souls of animals and plants. It has its own internal life, which 
is different than the one the body brings to it. As the body penetrates 
the soul, it makes it imperfect, but it does not rid it of autonomy; on the 
contrary, it conditions the autonomy. It is a source originating the soul’s 
cognitive activities. The autonomy of the soul’s activity determines its 
continuation after being separated from the body.15
 13 Cf. ibidem, pp. 162–163.
 14 Ibidem, pp. 163–164.
 15 Cf. ibidem, p. 165.
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Gogacz’s philosophy of being is a metaphysics of an individual being. 
The author calls it ontic pluralism. Underlying it is the thesis about the 
uniqueness of the principles of being, which he uses to construct a thesis 
about the uniqueness of every individuum having real existence. In his 
works he emphasises the complete interpenetration of the soul and 
the body, their ontic unity. He assumes that the human soul possesses 
a radically different nature than the nature of the body, but at the same 
time he categorically dissociates himself from dualism. He terms it – 
like monism – a metaphysical error. Therefore, he finds anthropological 
concepts by, inter alia, Plato, Descartes16 to be erroneous, but even in 
Saint Thomas he can discern traces of the dualist perception of man.  He 
claims that Thomas Aquinas does not always emphasise the complete 
interpenetration of the body and soul strongly enough. He notes that 
philosophers readily refer to dualism, where the body is perceived as 
functional, as a tool used by the soul during its earthly life, because in 
the dualist scheme of things it is easier to substantiate the existence of 
the soul after it is separated from the body.17 The theory of the complete 
interpenetration of body and soul involves the necessity to provide the 
reason for the autonomous existence of the soul after a man’s death. 
As they try to overcome this difficulty, Thomists resort to a solution 
consisting in weaker highlighting of the interpenetration of body and 
 16 “Dualism consists in the parallel being of purely spiritual structures and purely material struc-
tures. That is the form it takes - as we know - in Plato, but first and foremost in Descartes. And this 
Platonic or Cartesian concept of dualism is the tool most frequently utilised when explaining the 
relationship between the body and soul. The soul is then treated as a non-complex structure, as is 
the body. Autonomous being, bound parallel to the soul, is attributed to the body. This parallelist 
dualism is easy to identify and refute, demonstrating the contradiction of pure, internally non-com-
plex beings besides God” (ibidem, p. 167).
 17 “In pure dualism this matter [demonstrating existence of the soul after it has been attached 
to the body – B. L.] does not pose a problem. The soul is a structurally simple being and becomes 
attached to the body, which is a non-complex substance as well, in a practically seeming and com-
pletely external manner. As the soul becomes detached from the body, it acquires its specific mode 
of being, not embroiled in an ontically vague connection with the body. Plato was right in explain-
ing this vague connection by resorting to an additional theory of punishment” (ibidem, p. 169).
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soul, as well as to the theory of commensuratio.18 Gogacz flatly rejects 
the first element of this solution, while he reinterprets the second one.19
2.2. The subject of consciousness as an individuum
The operation of human consciousness naturally directs man towards 
reflection on himself as an individual entity, making him ask the question: 
 18 The Thomistic tradition gave rise to the theory of commensuratio animae ed hoc corpus as a 
development of Saint Thomas Aquinas’ idea of the soul’s adjustment to a specific body. As it exists in 
the body, the human soul gets individuated by matter. Death constitutes a rift in man’s natural struc-
ture, a separation of matter and form, body and soul. To demonstrate the entity’s immortality Saint 
Thomas contended that the human soul is oriented towards the body, with which during man’s life-
time it constitutes an ontic whole. The idea not only served to defend the entity’s immortality, but also 
expressed the belief that transmigration of souls, i.e. reincarnation, is not possible.  Saint Thomas un-
derstood a soul’s orientation towards a specific body as a consequence of the proportion of the soul 
to the body, of their mutual adjustment. He did not explicite use the formula commensuratio animae 
ad hoc corpus, but the term commensuratio (adaptation, symmetry, commensurateness), which he 
used alongside such terms as habitudo (habituation, conditioning) and proportio (proportion). The 
expression commensuratio animae ad hoc corpus was and still is used by the continuators of Aquinas’ 
ideas, inter alia, Kajetan, S. Swieżawski, M. Krasnodębski et al. The idea of the soul’s adaptation to a 
specific body features in many of Aquinas’ texts, e.g.  De ente et essentia (cap. 2), De Veritate (q. 2 a. 
of. 9-10, a. 5), Scriptum super “Sententias” (Lib. IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3), Expositio super librum Boethi 
“De Trinitate” (q. 4, a. 2), Summa contra gentiles (Lib. I, cap. 21; Lib. II, cap. 81; Lib. IV, cap. 63) and 
Summa theologiae (I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4; I, q. 75, a. 5; I, q. 85, a. 1; I, q. 86, a. 3 et al.). Cf. M. A. Krąpiec, 
Zagadnienie jednostkowienia bytów materialnych, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 1958, vol. 6 bull. 1, pp. 106-
108. In his Summa contra gentiles Thomas Aquinas expresses the idea of commensuratio, inter alia, 
in the following words: “Multitudo igitur animarum a corporibus separatarum consequitur quidem 
diversitatem formarum secundum substantiam, quia alia est substantia huius animae et illius: non 
tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium ipsius animae, nec est secun-
dum diversam rationem animae; sed est secundum diversam commensurationem animarum ad cor-
pora; haec enim anima est commensurata huic corpori et non illi, illa autem alii, et sic de omnibus. 
Huiusmodi autem commensurationes remanent in animabus etiam pereuntibus corporibus: sicut 
et ipsae earum substantiae manent, quasi a corporibus secundum esse non dependentes. Sunt enim 
animae secundum substantias suas formae corporum: alias accidentaliter corpori unirentur, et sic 
ex anima et corpore non fieret unum per se, sed unum per accidens. Inquantum autem formae sunt, 
oportet eas esse corporibus commensuratas. Unde patet quod ipsae diversae commensurationes ma-
nent in animabus separatis: et per consequens pluralitas” (Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles. On the 
truth of the catholic faith, Book Two: Creation, translated by James F. Anderson, New York 1955–57, 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles2.htm#81 [accessed 02.04.2014]).
 19 Cf. M. Gogacz, Istnieć i poznawać…, pp. 166–169 and 178–179.
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who am I? This question arises against the backdrop of the experience 
of one’s cognition and the experience of oneself as the cognitive agent. 
These two kinds of experience are an effect of man possessing two types 
of consciousness: simple consciousness and self-consciousness. Simple 
consciousness is responsible for reacting to stimuli and mirroring objects. 
It is entirely different from the simple animal consciousness. It is richer in 
semantic information thanks to which man not only mirrors objects, but 
can also understand what they are, distinguish them from one another, 
approach them cognitively independently of practical needs and refer 
them to that which is general, developing concepts.20
The working of self-consciousness consists in referring all data to 
one centre – “I.” It has two forms: non-reflective and reflective, that 
is introspective one called internal experience. Non-reflective self-
consciousness always accompanies simple consciousness, and its 
operation consists in man feeling himself to be the subject of his own 
conscious states, knowing that he is a human and knowing that he is 
different from all other objects in the surrounding world, as well as from 
other people. Non-reflective self-consciousness can turn into reflective 
self-consciousness, that is the subject’s reflection on himself.21
What then is the subject? The fundamental structure of the 
subject consists in his being “reflective transcendence.” “Reflective 
transcendence” is a formal expression used to define a basic “scaffold” of 
the human subjectivity. Here, “transcendence” means moving towards 
objective contents external to the subject, while “reflective” means 
mirroring them. The subject is not composed of the structure of reflective 
transcendence and some other component elements, but is a reflective 
transcendence. Its working consists in going “outside” itself, in mirroring 
objective contents and returning “to itself ” to assimilate them. In the 
process it does not lose its identity or simplicity owing to the fact that it 
keeps its distance from all the absorbed contents.22
 20 Cf. S. Judycki, Samoświadomość i unikalność…, p. 4.
 21 Cf. ibidem, s. 4–5.
 22 Cf. S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby…, pp. 116–117.
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As he defines the subject of consciousness more closely, Judycki notes 
that it does not identify with any of the consequences of temporal states: 
neither stream of consciousness states, nor physical brain states. The 
subject is irreducible to the contents of the stream of consciousness. It is 
nonspatial. The human “I” does not take up space; it has no length, no 
width, no depth. The subject is atemporal. It exists outside time, which is 
to mean that time and its changes do not “affect” its existence. This does 
not, however, mean the subject is timeless; it exists in time in the sense 
that it experiences time. But it can make it through time, not giving in 
to temporal occurrences and processes. My past “I’s” – writes Judycki 
in the spirit of Roman Ingarden’s phenomenology – are past only in 
appearance, because there is always one identical “I” that is present in 
different periods of time. Moreover, the subject is a unique unity and 
simplicity. The human “I” is not composed of parts that it could be 
divided into.23
The aspatial, atemporal, uniform and simple subject of consciousness, 
which does not identify with any of the consequences of temporal states, 
is a substantial subject. It is aware of its own existence through changes 
and of being the basis of the changes that occur in it. In the face of these 
changes it can act in a passive manner, but it can also initiate its own 
activity. It is capable of receiving data, understanding them, as well as of 
reacting to that which it mirrors. Judycki stresses the active role of the 
subject in conscious processes. The experience of subjectivity that takes 
place in intellectual immediacy is the experience of oneself as not only 
the “centre of activity,” but simply a “causative power” originating acts of 
will, acts of thinking, acts of judgement and acts of evaluation.24
Judycki’s concept of the uniqueness of the human person is a concept 
of the uniqueness of the subject of consciousness, that is the human 
soul. Man is merely individual. His soul is unique. Like Descartes, the 
author of Samoświadomość i pamięć assumes that man “is composed of ” 
 23 Cf. ibidem, pp. 315–321.
 24 Cf. S. Judycki, Świadomość i pamięć. Uzasadnienie dualizmu antropologicznego, Lublin 2004, 
pp. 315, 346–347, 367, 382–383.
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a physical – biological – body and a spiritual soul, which interact with 
each other. He calls his theory an “interactionist-type anthropological 
dualism.” He leaves open the issue of whether man is constituted by 
two substances or only one, i.e. whether it is only the immaterial soul, 
or perhaps the material body too, that has a substantial character. He 
claims that the soul is a radically heterogeneous substance relative to 
the body and that which is physical, but he does not decide whether 
the existence of the physical world is substantial.  He recognises the 
possibility that souls are the only substances among beings, and physical 
objects are not substances at all or at least they are not substances in the 
sense that souls are.25
Recognising only the human soul as a unique person results in 
a question about the role of the body and the relationship between the 
soul and the body. A description of the “metaphysical birth” of the subject 
is the answer. Judycki claims that the subject of consciousness “begins” to 
exist the moment the first contents are accepted. Accepting the contents 
constitutes its “metaphysical birth.” It consists in simple grasping of the 
contents (simplex apprehensio) which in a way triggers the “mechanism” 
of reflective transcendence, and is an act whereby “incarnation,” that is 
embodiment of the subject, takes place. From this moment on one can 
speak about the existence of the subject and its experience of the body. 
The experience of one’s own body comprises experience of visual body, 
that is an object that we observe in space next to other objects, experience 
of tangible body, which arises as a result of touching visual body and 
touching objects with it, experience of kinaesthetic body, which is a result 
of having special motor sensations, and experience of willing body, that 
is of a physical thing that we can freely move within certain limits.26 
 25 Cf. ibidem, p. 301.
 26 “The willing body is in greatest «contact» with myself as a rational, will-endowed subject. 
The way it happens is that the experience «I can» concerns the kinesthetic, tactile and visual sphere, 
but also refers to the incorporeal sphere: not only can I reach for some object, but I can also stop 
thinking about one thing, and start thinking about another thing […], etc.” (S. Judycki, Bóg i inne 
osoby…, p. 132).
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An experiential synthesis of these bodies gives rise to a “phenomenal 
body” – an experience of a “living body.”27
The phenomenal body is a condition for the substantial subject’s self-
expression, its “presence” for itself and other subjects. In the research 
paper Świadomość i pamięć Judycki points out that the body does not 
stand in the way of self-discovery or communication with other persons, 
but he adds that there are no empirical or conceptual reasons to believe 
that the human body is a suitable or optimal means of expression for the 
substantial subject. It is something purely contingent and unnecessary 
that the human soul appears in a physical body. Furthermore, there 
are no rational reasons to exclude the soul’s capability to express itself 
not in one, but in many bodies (metempsychosis). As Judycki claims, 
using philosophical arguments, it is not possible to prove that a soul 
is assigned to one body only. However, it is possible on the theological 
plane. Therefore, the main difficulty that arises in Judycki’s theory is the 
argument for the individuality of the human person. Since the body does 
not individuate a person, who himself is a simple quality, where is the 
reason for its individuality to be found?
According to Gogacz, to be an individuum means to be a real being 
formed out of unique principles. To be an individual human means to 
be a spiritual and corporeal entity formed out of an individual, rational 
soul and only its own, peculiar and specific body, and to be a spiritual 
and corporeal unity.
According to Judycki, to be an individuum means to be a living being, 
while to be unique means to be a person - a simple quality, a point of 
reference for conscious activities, a substantial subject, a causative power 
of cognition and action, a soul bound to a body and, by extension, 
experiencing the body and expressing itself in the body. 
 27 Cf. ibidem, Świadomość i pamięć…, pp. 339-342. “[…] I wish to state that the experience of 
the «intimate union» between the subject and its body is a biradial experience: one radius follows 
towards the ever-present - as an actuality and ever-anticipated potentiality - synthesis of the kines-
thetic, tactile and visual body, while the other one refers to the sphere of thinking and the sphere of 
decisions made by the will” (idem, Bóg inne osoby…, p. 132).
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3. The reason for individuality
3.1. The reason for individuality from the perspective of 
Thomistic metaphysics
In the Thomistic tradition – as Gogacz observes – the singularity of 
the human soul, after it has been separated from the body, used to be 
explained with the theory of commensuratio. The theory has it that after 
a man’s death the human soul remains singular, because it is “directed” 
at the body, “oriented” towards the body from which it has become 
separated. A soul’s being directed at a specific body is understood as 
a relation. This understanding contains an underlying assumption 
whereby the body is a separate thing, a substance at which a soul directs 
itself. Substantialising the body – claims Gogacz – is an error, because 
the body as a reason for the particularity of being is potency, a sum of 
privations measured out by a given form. For a form to measure out these 
privations, it needs to be singular. Therefore, the reason for its singularity 
cannot be matter, and that still holds in the face of the fact that from the 
viewpoint of time the effect that form has on matter and the effect that 
matter has on form are simultaneous.28
Gogacz can find a way to overcome these difficulties in modification 
of the theory of commensuratio whereby particularisation should be 
differentiated from singularisation.  He claims that matter is not a reason 
for the singularity of the soul, but for its particularity. At the moment 
when the body is being actualised the soul is already singular, and owing 
to the fact that the body is actualised it becomes particular. The reason for 
the singularity of the soul must be something else than the body. It cannot 
be the act of existence, because the nature of the act does not involve 
limitation. Nor can it be assumed that God creating a particular soul 
right away is the reason, because that would imply the necessity to reject 
the pluralist thesis whereby the ontic structure of being contains all that 
constitutes it and on account of this “it is self-explanatory for what it is.”29
 28 Cf. M. Gogacz, Istnieć i poznawać…, pp. 185, 208.
 29 Cf. ibidem.
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The reason for the individuality of the soul, which makes it capable 
of individual existence after being separated from the body, must be an 
element in the ontic structure, and it must be contained in the soul itself. 
Commensuratio construed traditionally as a soul’s relational orientation 
towards the body excludes a singularising factor operating within the 
soul, because a relation as an accidental being is not an element in the 
ontic structure. What conditions then must the singularising factor 
meet? Above all, it must be potency, because its task is about limiting. The 
potency must be necessary and essential, because it must be unloseable 
for the soul. There is only one element in the soul’s ontic structure that 
meets these conditions - the passive intellect. Commensuratio - as Gogacz 
believes - should be understood as the soul’s internal singularisation by 
the passive (“commensurating”) intellect, which adapts the soul to accept 
the particularity brought in by the body, so that the soul’s main goal can 
be attained, that is cognition and free choice.30
The concept of the passive intellect as a soul-singularising factor 
justifies the need for the body in the human structure.  Thanks to the 
body the soul can effect human cognition which has its origins in sense 
data. The modified theory of commensuratio also serves to defend the 
individual existence of the soul after a man’s death, that is the immortality 
of a person. Like Judycki, Gogacz claims that the human soul is a human 
 30 Cf. ibidem, p. 193. And here arises the question of what role in a soul’s individuation is played 
by the other spiritual powers, i.e. the active intellect and the will.  Gogacz considers that only the 
passive intellect is the reason for individuation. “It appears that this role is played by the necessary 
potency only. And from this follows that it is not all the powers of the soul, as its potencies, that 
make this soul imperfect or individuate proportionately. Apart from the will this would also apply 
to the active intellect. But I highlighted only the passive intellect as the principle internally making 
the soul imperfect, as it is peculiarly primary in the soul. The free will acts already on the basis of 
the information provided by the passive intellect, which also requires the working of the active in-
tellect, which in turn prepares intellectually cognitive contents. Thus, as they depend in action on 
the passive intellect, the will and the intellect are peculiarly secondary to it and subjectified in it. As 
regards nature, they too are - like the passive intellect - potency, which in action is, however, of a 
secondary character accidental in relation to it, and so it turns the soul to the body, so that cogni-
tion and a cognition-based choice of good are possible” (ibidem, p. 198).
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person.31 Death annihilates a man, but not a person, because the 
principles of a person do not include a body. After a man’s death, his 
soul lasts, devoid of the body, but oriented towards it and waiting to be 
reunited with it.32
3.2. The reason for individuality from the perspective of 
phenomenological epistemology 
Judycki distinguishes between the experience of subjectivity and the 
experience of uniqueness. As regards the experience of subjectivity his 
position does not change. He claims that this experience is accessible 
in intellectual, that is non-sensory, immediacy. As regards the issue 
concerned with uniqueness his position evolves. In the 2004 treatise 
entitled Świadomość i pamięć. Uzasadnienie dualizmu antropologicznego 
 31 “In keeping with the substantialist perception of being, the ontic reason for a person cannot 
be  outside the person. It is not embedded in man as man. Then it must be embedded in the soul. 
And for this reason in the strict sense it is the rational soul that is a person. In other words, the con-
dition and carrier of the reason constituting the person is a spiritual being, that is a being whose ex-
istence is independent of the presence of matter [...]. Such an approach [...] [highlights - B. L.] that 
all the contents relevant to a given being are contributed to a specific substance by its substantial 
form. Because a soul is a person, a human is a person too. The thesis that the rational form contrib-
utes all the human species contents to the potential body underlies the conviction that the soul can 
be recognised as a person in the strict sense, and man can be recognised as a person in the broad 
sense” (M. Gogacz, Wokół problemu osoby…, pp. 172–173).
 32 Also S. Swieżawski and A. B. Stępień find the thesis that the human soul, having been sepa-
rated from the body, is still oriented towards it, to be the argument for the future resurrection of the 
body. Świeżawski writes: “The combination of the body and soul in man is so natural that death as 
a breakup of this hylemorphic compound is something tragic, a violation of nature, and that is why 
following man’s death the soul, as it lives without the body, desires with all its essence to become 
combined with the body again, waiting for the body to be resurrected. And that is why the resur-
rection of the body, as presented to us in the Revelation, is in fact a return to the fullness of nature, 
even though as a fact it can only be effected miraculously, thanks to God’s supernatural interven-
tion (S. Swieżawski, Wstęp do „Kwestii 76”, [in:] Tomasz z Akwinu, Traktat o człowieku. Suma te-
ologii 1,75-89, trans. and ed. S. Swieżawski, Kęty 1998, p. 80). Stępień expresses this thought as fol-
lows: “This new mode of being is something unnatural for the soul, if by nature it is supposed to be 
a substantial form of a specific body. That is why when separated from the body, the soul natural-
ly strives to be reincarnated. Hence «the resurrection of bodies» is (in the philosophical scheme of 
things) at least probable” (A. B. Stępień, Wprowadzenie do metafizyki, Kraków 1964, p. 187).
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he claims that the experience of uniqueness is accessible to the subject 
in introspective reflection. He compares it to perception of a particular 
shade of colour for which we do not have a linguistic name, but we are 
able to distinguish it from other shades of the same colour. The subject 
experiences uniqueness as a peculiar “shade” of self-consciousness. 
The experience of one’s uniqueness is very limited and vague, and in 
order to be able to specify it more clearly one would need to share in the 
experience of the uniqueness of other subjects. An experience like this, 
however, is not accessible to us. Other subjects are accessible to us only 
through the agency of their linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour.33
In the papers Samoświadomość i unikalność osób ludzkich of 2007 
and Bóg i inne osoby. Próba z zakresu teologii filozoficznej of 2010 Judycki 
radicalises his position concerning a person’s capacity for the internal 
experience of uniqueness. He no longer considers that it is vague, but 
finds it to be impossible at all. As he substantiates his thesis, he begins 
with an analysis of the term “person.” In Antiquity it denoted a ‘mask’ 
used by theatre actors. Human consciousness, as it presents a mask of its 
own uniqueness, is an analogy of theatre. The uniqueness of one’s own 
as well as of other persons is concealed under masks including, inter alia, 
the mask of the conviction that the subject one is is a pure “I,” an empty 
pole to which all data and experiences relate to, the mask of character 
traits, the mask of matter one’s body is composed of, etc.34
According to Judycki, the experience of one’s own and other 
persons’ uniqueness will only be accessible after death. This will be 
accomplished owing to “transfiguration,” that is a qualitative “leap” 
taken by human consciousness. Judycki lists the consequences of this 
change in consciousness such as elimination of the opposition between 
 33 Cf. S. Judycki, Świadomość i pamięć…, p. 366.
 34 Cf. ibidem, p. 368 and idem, Samoświadomość i unikalność…, pp. 10 and 12. “Any attempt 
at visualising the uniqueness of every specific person is that difficult, because the world [in – B. L.] 
which we live is a world of matter, and this in turn means that it is a world in which objects are sub-
ject to replication: there are many squirrels, many copies of Rafael’s painting called Madonna Tempi, 
many people looking alike with similar character traits. It is matter that «covers» the uniqueness of 
persons in manifold manners” (S. Judycki, Samoświadomość i unikalność…, p. 12).
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phenomena and things-in-themselves, emergence of the capacity to 
directly experience and understand the way in which the general is 
realised in the particular (e.g. the way to realise the human species in 
a human individual), a change in the manner of relating to space and 
time (space will become
“internalised,” and time will change its structure).  All this – the philosopher 
conjectures – will be relative to the major change consisting in seeing oneself. Ours 
and other persons’ masks will be torn off, and so we will have unmediated expe-
rience of ours and others’ uniqueness; we will get to know the natures of particular 
persons and will see how ours and their consciousness follows from these natures.35
The experience of the uniqueness of persons “[...] would be equivalent 
to the enchantment experienced when watching a sunrise for the first 
time; the experience would be as dazzling as gazing right into the centre 
of nuclear explosion, and what is more, the intensity of the experience 
would never be subject to any schematisation, habituation, etc.”36 To the 
question whether the experience would be like cognition of a sensory or 
rather intellectual character, Judycki answers that most probably it could 
be likened to the experience of pictorial beauty, which is both sensory 
and supersensory.37
In Judycki’s opinion, the change to consciousness taking place 
at death is one of the elements of that which in Christianity is called 
“blessed vision.” The basic element in this vision is a consciousness-based 
reference to God, viewing Him “face to face,” as well as participating in 
the life of the Holy Trinity and human persons. The author of Świadomość 
i pamięć surmises that access to this life will not be granted immediately, 
at one moment, but will be a process extending over time, with time 
having a completely different character than the one presently familiar 
 35 “Seeing oneself will be simultaneous with seeing the way in which one’s consciousness is a 
derivative of one’s individual essence” (S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby. Próba z zakresu teologii filozo-
ficznej, Poznań 2010, p. 178).
 36 Idem, Samoświadomość i unikalność…, p. 8.
 37 Cf. ibidem, p. 12.
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to us. That will be unlimited and changed time of continual changes, ever 
new experiences and incessant, mutual understanding-suffused dialogue 
reflecting innermost human desires.38
But if in earthly life it is not possible to experience the uniqueness of 
one’s own and other persons, then what grounds do we have to assume 
that
persons are unique beings? Judycki answers this question on the theological 
plane.39 He considers that the reason for the uniqueness of human persons is God. He 
creates unique persons, because His intention “[...] can’t have been to make happy the 
greatest possible number of entities who would differ from one another the way, say, 
fruit flies differ from one another. This would not be difficult for the Almighty God, but 
it would be unworthy of Him.”40 If we presuppose that the purpose of human persons 
is eternal life with God - the author suggests - then we must assume that God did not 
want to create “pure subjects,” or subjects devoid of uniqueness, and that He wanted 
unique beings to be destined for eternal life. Besides, man was created in the image 
and likeness of God, who despite being one, constitutes a Trinity of unique Persons. 
The happiness of the Divine Persons consists, inter alia, in engaging in constant 
communication. For similar communication to be possible among human persons, 
 38 Cf. S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby…, p. 220.
 39 Judycki writes: “[…] apart from a purely analytical character, the whole of this argumentation 
is also of a confessional character, which means that it revolves around the contents acknowledged 
by religion, theology and Christian philosophy […]” (S. Judycki, Samoświadomość i unikalność…, 
p. 11). This course of action is determined by the subject under discussion and its purpose. In the 
research paper Bóg i inne osoby, which is an elaboration of the ideas contained in Samoświadomość 
i unikalność…, Judycki employs the same method. He justifies the employment of it as follows: 
„«Bóg i inne osoby» is an attempt at philosophical discussion and consolidation of some basic con-
victions concerned with Christian religion and theology. The philosophical character of this book 
lies in, inter alia, the fact that I try to formulate the reasons for the existence of God, the necessity 
for Incarnation [...], and these reasons do not refer to the Christian Revelation as the so-called con-
text of substantiation, but solely as the context of discovery.  I also address philosophical issues con-
cerned with the nature of consciousness and the nature of the soul, the living human body, the es-
sence of communication between persons, eternal life, omnipotence, the triple nature of God, and 
the history of human persons. [...] I am convinced that there can be no philosophy which, if thor-
oughly pursued, could not produce the effects of theoretical relevance for the fundamental issues 
concerned with the Christian outlook on life” (S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby…, pp. 11-12).
 40 S. Judycki, Samoświadomość i unikalność…, p. 2.
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and for it to be exciting enough to provide eternal life with meaningful content, it is 
necessary that human persons are unique beings.41
As we mentioned before, the reason for the individuality of a human 
person (a soul) in Gogacz’s pluralistic metaphysics is the passive intellect, 
exposed with the method of identification of the principles of being. It 
serves to explain the presence of a body in man’s ontic structure, as well 
as the “assignment” of a soul to one body, and its individual existence 
after man’s death. In Judycki’s phenomenological epistemology a human 
person (a soul) is a simple quality. It experiences itself as a subject, 
but it does not experience itself as as a unique subject. The reason for 
uniqueness is not identifiable within the field of philosophy, and requires 
a recourse to theology. The reason is God, who created man in his image 
and likeness.
4. The concept of a human person
In the history of philosophy there are two main trends in perception 
of the human person: a substantialist and a relationalist one. The 
substantialist trend has its origins in Aristotle’s philosophy and is based 
on his theory of substance, that is an autonomous being whose existence 
does not require any other being external to it. The relationalist trend 
is a continuation of Plato’s thought. Its authors construct a concept 
of person by referring to his relationships with other beings: human 
persons (e.g. Martin Buber), God (e.g. Karl Rahner), society (e.g. Karl 
Marx), nature (e.g. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin), culture (e.g. Claude Lévi-
Strauss) or himself, his own existence (e.g. Karl Jaspers). The point of the 
substantialist concepts is to recognise the human person as an ontically 
complete being containing within its ontic structure all its constitutive 
principles. The point of the relationalist concepts is to recognise the 
person as a part of a bigger whole, e.g. society, culture, nature, and by 
 41 Cf. ibidem, p. 11.
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extension – to acknowledge that some of his principles are to be found 
beyond its ontic sphere.42
4.1. The Thomistic concept of the human person
Gogacz’s concept of person is a substantialist approach constructed 
upon the foundation of the approaches developed by Aristotle, Boethius 
and Saint Thomas Aquinas.  The author of Elementarz metafizyki defines 
the person as a “self-contained individual being,” an “autonomous 
individual being” and “subsistence.” However, unlike Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, he claims that man is a person in the broad sense, while in 
the narrow sense it is the human soul, and not man, that is a person.43 
He refers to the person as “[...] an individual being whose existence 
through its manifestations releases a personal relation of love, faith and 
hope, while triggering rationality in the essence of this being. In other 
words, a person is an individual and rational being capable of love and 
trust.”44 Next to the act of existence, the above-cited definition mentions 
rationality among the principles of the person. As was stated before, the 
reason for the person is the passive intellect present in the structure of 
the soul. Thus, the appellation of rational being is due to man even if 
he does not or cannot create concepts, judgements or reasonings. The 
subject of these actions is the active intellect, which constitutes a person’s 
immaterial (spiritual) accident. However, it is not a cause of a possible 
 42 Cf. M. Gogacz, Wokół problemu osoby…, p. 17. Gogacz explains the basis for the division of 
concepts of the human person into substantialist and relationalist ones in the following way: “The 
Platonic manner in which the human person is characterised comes down to the claim that that 
which a given human is is to be found outside him. Thus, the human person is constituted by his 
relationship with beings found outside the ontic sphere of man. Such a manner of characterising 
the human person can be termed a ‘relationalist approach.’ The Aristotelian manner of describing 
the human person can be encapsulated in the claim whereby that which a given man is constitutes 
him internally. This internal ontic content of man’s is an autonomous, self-sufficient, non-absolute 
being called ‘substance.’ The Aristotelian manner of describing the human person can be termed a 
‘substantialist approach’ (ibidem).
 43 Cf. note 31.
 44 M. Gogacz, Wprowadzenie do etyki chronienia osób, Warszawa 1998, p. 9.
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lack of intellectual competence. The cause includes bodily dysfunctions 
preventing proper working of sensory powers operating from their own 
organs inside the body. Inappropriate working of the sensory powers 
prevents the operation of the active intellect, because - according to the 
Aristotelian principle - nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the 
senses. Thus, in the scheme of Gogacz’s concept of person, no man can 
be denied the appellation of rational being, and therefore the appellation 
of person.
Gogacz spares relatively little attention to the issue of cognition of 
a person’s individuality. Pursuing the ramifications of his concept of person 
and of personal relationships, one can assume that he finds observation 
and analysis of external reality to be the path leading to cognition of 
a person’s individuality. As a continuator of Saint Thomas Aquinas’ 
philosophy, he believes that we are not granted direct cognitive access 
to our own souls, but we know them indirectly through their activities. 
We get to know other persons by establishing personal relationships 
with them. Establishing relationships is a natural consequence of being 
a person, a result of a person’s spontaneous reaction to another person. 
Personal relationships are characterised by bidirectionality and being 
founded on the transcendental manifestations of existence.45 The reality 
of persons underlies the relationship of love that takes the form of amor 
(romantic love), caritas (parental love), agape (love between God and 
man) and amicitia (friendship); the truth underlies the relationship of 
faith, which in its active aspect takes the form of veracity, while in its 
passive aspect - of trust; good underlies the relationship of hope, the 
active aspect of which is doing good, the passive aspect being anticipation 
 45 “The personal effect of transcendental properties on other persons’ transcendentals takes 
place independently of cognition and decisions. Cognition and decisions only cause one to make 
use of these relationships, protecting or destroying them. Protecting and destroying here means 
deepening personal relationships, their growing intensity, and not annihilation. When beings exist 
and their existence is manifested, relationships of an existential character are established between 
them, while between persons relationships of a personal character are established. Personal rela-
tionships take precedence over all other relationships, because all the content of being is preceded 
by its specific act of existence” (M. Gogacz, Elementarz metafizyki, Warszawa 1998, pp. 50–51).
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of good. Personal relationships are established between human persons, 
as well as between human persons and God.
4.2. The phenomenological concept of the human person
As Judycki notes, the philosophical tradition typically defines the 
person as a conscious and self-conscious, rational and free being capable 
of responding to values and of creating culture. Such a definition is 
essentially correct, though incomplete, because its characterisation of 
the person is only formal. It points to what is common to all persons, 
but does not say anything about their uniqueness. In Judycki’s approach, 
to be a human person means to be a unique entity, radically different 
from all other human entities. He uses the following terms to refer to 
the person: a “subject of consciousness,” “reflective transcendence,” 
a “substantial subject,” a “soul” and a “unique quality.” The majority 
of these are definitions based on a cognitive perspective. In Judycki’s 
approach a human person is a unique subject capable of consciousness 
and cognition. In the light of the concept of “reflective transcendence” 
one might even say that it is a subject constituted by cognition.
Judycki’s theory of the person is a synthesis of the relationalist and 
substantialist approaches. It is grounded in Descartes’s philosophy of 
the subject, but on account of the substance theory it refers to object 
philosophy. The theory of substance employed by Judycki is not a classical 
theory. The author of Świadomość i pamięć modifies the Aristotelian 
definition of substance, introducing relationalist elements derived from 
the philosophy of Plato and Saint Augustine. Like the latter one, he 
assumes that the relationships that bind a person to other persons are 
intrinsic to his essence. “The person – he believes – is something stable, 
persevering through the changes to his states and being the subject of 
these, and in this sense the person is a substance, but at the same time 
it is peculiar to his essence, and hence to his substance, to engage in 
relationships. A lonely person could not be a person, the theological 
proof of this being the Holy Trinity, where the relationships between the 
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persons are not exclusively accidental, and therefore unnecessary, but are 
of a substantial character.”46
The synthesis of the relationalist and substantialist perception of the 
person
in Judycki’s philosophy constitutes an implication of the quest for the answer to 
the question about the uniqueness of the human person in the opposing philosophi-
cal concepts - the relationalist approaches of Plato, Saint Augustine and Descartes as 
well as the substantialist approaches of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. A ver-
bal manifestation of this synthesis is the use of the term “substantial subject” which 
is a combination of the term “subject,” characteristic of relationalist philosophy, and 
the term “substance,” typical of object philosophy.
The distinctive feature of Judycki’s concept of the human person is its 
focus on the issue of uniqueness. Not only does the author of Świadomość 
i pamięć ask whether the experience of uniqueness is possible and how 
it might present itself in consciousness, but he also takes up the issue 
of its implications. He enumerates a few of these. The first one is the 
absence of boundaries in qualitative differentiation of persons. Human 
persons differ radically, even though from our viewpoint they appear to 
be alike. Taking into consideration all persons who have lived, live and 
will live in the future, there is an infinite number of unique persons. The 
second implication of the uniqueness of persons is the uniqueness of 
interpersonal connections. Since every person is a radically unique being, 
all the relationships he builds are radically unique. The third implication 
is the infinity of persons’ cognitive activity. Even though a self-conscious 
subject, as he mirrors a variety of objects, in a way “becomes” them, 
cognition never “fills” him to the degree that his activity should come 
to an end. Every time the subject receives data, it goes beyond them, 
opening up to new data. Judycki calls these three implications of the 
uniqueness of human persons three “infinities”: the infinity of unique 
 46 S. Judycki, Samoświadomość i unikalność…, p. 13.
84 Bożena Listkowska
human persons, the infinity of possible relationships between them, and 
the infinity of their cognitive activity.47
Even though Gogacz’s and Judycki’s concepts of the person have 
different foundations, in several issues they are convergent. Both 
the philosophers assume that: 1. The person is an individual being; 
2. A human soul is the person; 3. A person’s individuality is closely related 
to his intellectual capacity (Gogacz relates it to the passive intellect, 
while Judycki relates it to self-consciousness and manner of cognition); 
4. The human soul is radically different from the body and is immortal; 
5. Establishing and maintaining relationships with other human persons 
and God is an intrinsic feature of the person. With regard to the latter 
issue, the presented concepts of the person seem the most convergent. In 
Gogacz’s opinion it is the environment of persons, and not nature or the 
world of culture, that is “man’s true world,” the world in which he “makes 
himself at home,” feels happy and where staying is the meaning of his 
life. Judycki writes: “It is not that people are predestined to exist by the 
world, but the world was created for human persons.”48 It has been called 
world only because it is populated by self-conscious beings who build 
interpersonal relationships. The purpose of persons is eternal life with 
other persons. Underlying this life is “existential” communication which 
is not only about conveying unique contents, but also about participation 
in other persons’ lives.49
Conclusion
Thomism and phenomenology investigate different types of 
experience, employing different conceptual apparatuses and different 
research methods. Their analyses give rise to different kinds of problems 
and make it necessary to pose different questions. The rationale behind 
the present discussion was to show that these two different perspectives 
 47 Cf. ibidem, pp. 12-13 and S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby…, pp. 16–17 and 214.
 48 S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby…, p. 17.
 49 Cf. ibidem, pp. 154–155.
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lead to two complementary images of the individual human person: an 
objective and a subjective one. These images cannot be simply “added” 
to each other, but on the other hand they are evidently complementary, 
which Karol Wojtyła emphasised and to which he referred in his 
philosophical anthropology.50 The complementary natures of Thomism 
and phenomenology are understood here as providing an answer to the 
questions that cannot be answered by either of the two philosophical trends 
alone. This may be illustrated exactly by Gogacz’s and Judycki’s concepts. 
From the perspective of Gogacz’s Thomism the questions concerned 
with a person’s manner of experiencing himself as a being capable of 
cognition, action, equipped with a body, as well as with a possible way of 
experiencing his own individuality prove insoluble. From the perspective 
of Judycki’s phenomenology the questions concerned with the reason for 
a human person’s individuality and a cause for his “incarnation” prove 
insoluble. The benefits of considering the individuality of the human 
person from both the Thomistic and phenomenological perspective 
appear to be worthwhile. From the viewpoint of Gogacz’s Thomism the 
major ones include broadening the horizon of discussion to include the 
sphere of the subject’s experience, while from the viewpoint of Judycki’s 
phenomenology - staying within the bounds of philosophy without the 
necessity of referring to theological deliberation.
A juxtaposition of Gogacz’s and Judycki’s concepts of the individuality 
of human persons shows that the knowability of uniqueness is 
a philosophical problem. Is it really insolvable? As yet too little has been 
said in the field of metaphysics about the uniqueness of human persons 
 50 The way in which Wojtyła combined the Thomistic reflection with phenomenological re-
flection in his discussion of man can be characterised thus: “According to Wojtyła it is not so much 
about the phenomenological justification for the way man is a person, but about using phenom-
enology to see how man is a person, how the metaphysical structures characterising his personal 
existence become reflected in his conscious existence. Therefore, the metaphysical Thomistic an-
thropology is here in a way present all the time, as a grand fundamental hypothesis which comes 
to be verified by a phenomenological analysis, and which – on the other hand – constantly guides 
the analysis, allowing it to become more profound” (R. Buttiglione, Kilka uwag o sposobie czytania 
„Osoby i czynu”, trans. T. Styczeń, [in:] K. Wojtyła, “Osoba i czyn” oraz inne studia antropologiczne, 
Lublin 2000, p. 15).
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for anyone to be able to authoritatively settle the issue concerned with 
the possibility of experiencing it. Hence, it is premature to state that 
we will never be able to find out what it is about. The discussion of the 
uniqueness of human persons is worth undertaking, and in a variety of 
philosophical trends for that matter. Apart from pursuing Thomistic and 
phenomenological analyses, of particular value might be discussion in 
the field of philosophy of dialogue, philosophy of language, philosophy 
of mind, which is indicated by the role of interpersonal relationships, 
and by extension communication, highlighted in Gogacz’s and Judycki’s 
concepts. There is a possibility that the thing that is researchwise difficult 
in one philosophical trend might be less intractable in another one on 
account of resorting to a different conceptual apparatus and different 
research methods. It is worth posing the question about the uniqueness 
of the human person, even if it appears to be “[…] one of the most 
difficult, if not the most difficult one of philosophical questions.”51 Let 
us add that from the viewpoint of philosophical anthropology, it is one 
of the most interesting questions.
Abstract
The aim of the article is presentation of two concepts of human individuality which 
have arisen in modern Polish philosophy of Mieczysław Gogacz and Stanisław Judycki. 
It is an attempt to look at the problem from two different philosophical perspectives: 
Thomistic metaphysics and phenomenological epistemology. Metaphysical approach is 
searching for an answer to the question about human individuality in their ontic struc-
ture, whereas phenomenological approach focuses on the analysis of a direct experi-
ence. As reason of individuality, Gogacz indicates potential intellect (passive) subjected 
in a substantial form (soul). Judycki maintains that this reason is the concept of God, 
according to whom He creates a soul of every human being as radically different from 
all other human souls, unique. Presented theories develop from a different way of un-
derstanding a human being. Gogacz’s theory has a substantial character, refers to the 
concept of a human of Aristotle, Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas. Judycki’s concept is 
 51 S. Judycki, Bóg i inne osoby…, p. 177.
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a relational approach, modified by elements of substantialist philosophy. He refers to re-
lational approach of Plato, Saint Augustine and Descartes as well as substantialist theo-
ries of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Thomistic and phenomenological approaches 
to individuality introduce fundamentally different and essential substance to philosophy 
concerning human beings. 
Keywords
Pluralism, dualism, human, individuality, Thomism, Phenomenology 
Bibliography
Gogacz M., Elementarz metafizyki, Warszawa 1998.
Gogacz M., Istnieć i poznawać, Warszawa 1976.
Gogacz M., Wokół problemu osoby, Warszawa 1974.
Gogacz M., Wprowadzenie do etyki chronienia osób, Warszawa 1998.
Judycki S., Bóg i inne osoby. Próba z zakresu teologii filozoficznej, Poznań 2010.
Judycki S., Świadomość i pamięć. Uzasadnienie dualizmu antropologicznego, Lublin 2004.
Kijewska A., Filozof i jego muzy. Antropologia Boecjusza – jej źródła i recepcja, Kęty 2011.
Krąpiec M. A., Zagadnienie jednostkowienia bytów materialnych, „Roczniki Filozoficzne” 
1958, vol. 6 bull. 1, pp. 97–148.
Stępień A. B., Wprowadzenie do metafizyki, Kraków 1964.
Tomasz z Akwinu, Traktat o człowieku. Suma teologii 1,75–89, trans. and ed. S. Swieżawski, 
Kęty 1998.
Wojtyła K., „Osoba i czyn” oraz inne studia antropologiczne, Lublin 2000.
Ziemiński I., Życie wieczne. Przyczynek do eschatologii filozoficznej, Kraków–Poznań 2013.
Judycki S., Samoświadomość i unikalność osób ludzkich, http://www.kul.pl/materialy-do-
-pobrania,art_19301.html (02.04.2014).
Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles. On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Book Two: Creation, 
translated by James F. Anderson, New York, 1955–57, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/
ContraGentiles2.htm#81 (02.04.2014).
